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BOOK REVIEWS
REVIEW ARTICLE
THE CREATION OF DELINQUENCY:
ETHNOMETHODOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL NIHILISM*
C. RONALD HUFF**
This "new" edition of Cicourel's widely-discussed 1968 volume should have included a
title change so that fewer readers might be
misled as to its contents. In his Introduction
(the only new feature of this otherwise unrevised "revised" edition), the author reminds us
that his study of juvenile justice was based on
two California cities, where he focused on
"those occasions where decisions are made by
bureaucratically responsible officials in the system of juvenile law enforcement and justice"
(p. xi). What we really have here is a study of
decision-making by individuals working in bureaucratic, socially organized settings. Unfortunately, for those who might be misled by the
book's title, this is not a study of social organization; rather, it is a study which takes place
within the context of complex organization. It is
a difference which makes a difference. A more
appropriate title for this book might have been
something like The Social Psychology of Labelling
Delinquents.
Much of this book consists of Professor Cicourel's exhaustive (and often exhausting) microsociological analyses of case materials gathered during his four year study of interactions
between juveniles and representatives of the
police, probation departments, and juvenile
courts. Central to the author's argument is his
assertion that these interactions often lead to
the "creation" of delinquency via the labelling
process, or what Cicourel refers to as "the
creation of history." Drawing on his extensive
*A
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case materials (police and probation reports,
field notes, verbatim transcripts, and other
sources of data), Cicourel contends that official
statistics on delinquency are, in reality, reified
idealizations of what were, originally, much
more complex events. The typification process,
which is a product of data reduction inevitably,
leads to distortions, and such distortions and
oversimplifications provide grounds for challenging the integrity of official statistics which
so often are cited by persons attempting to
describe or explain the delinquency problem.
I have no difficulty in accepting Cicourel's
descriptive documentations of how official discretion is used and misused. I have witnessed
similar events on many occasions in psychiatric,
correctional, and social welfare settings. I have
observed civil commitment hearings in which
constitutionally protected behavior such as a
sudden change in religious beliefs and. church
affiliation was cited by a psychiatrist as a clinical
indicator of acute personality disorganization
and, therefore, reason for commitment to a
mental hospital. So I have no quarrel with
Cicourel's assertion that it happens. Nor would
I insist-as some others have-that there must
be some controlled, empirical demonstration
of higher rates of recidivism before one can
argue that labelling may have negative effects.
Hirschi, for example, says: "Evidence that the
juvenile justice system has no effect on the
subsequent delinquency of the child is not
evidence that it has effects elsewhere."' My
own view is that unwarranted restrictions on
freedom can and do result from the labelling

By Aaron V. Cicourel. New York:

Crane, Russak & Company, 1977 (revised), Pp. xxi,
345. $15.75.
** Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology
and Anthropology, Purdue University.
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process and the misuse of official discretion
and that such restrictions are basically inconsistent with the principles of a democratic society.
Insofar as studies of labelling in general, and
Cicourel's book in particular, document and
describe such processes, I regard them as valuable contributions to the literature on the workings of the juvenile justice system. It is not
necessary to show that confinement in a reformatory leads to increased recidivism if one
accepts the thesis that involuntary confinement
per se, in the absence of due process and the
establishment of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, is unjust and therefore is an undesirable
effect.
So it is not on any of the above grounds that
I would quarrel with Cicourel; rather, I find
his study to be deficient in other respects. First,
this study fails to integrate the data and findings into a systematic, theoretical framework
which might improve our knowledge and understanding of complex organizations, juvenile
delinquency, or both. Second, there are problems that arise from the epistemological implications of Cicourel's arguments concerning the
possibilities of knowing "what happened."
While the case materials presented by the
author are valuable illustrations and descriptions of labellers at work (I use some of them
in my own classes), they do not take us very far
theoretically. We have long known that human
beings distort information, stereotype, and engage in selective perception. And we have
known since 19382 that some theorists believe
that these processes, when they occur in the
juvenile justice system, actually "create" the
delinquent. But none of this knowledge helps
us to construct a systematic theory of juvenile
delinquency. Similarly, one would be technically correct in arguing that without law, there
could be no crime. This sort of tautological
semanticism, however, is theoretically sterile.
For that reason, I must conclude that Cicourel's
study does not contribute much to the theoretical
literature on either juvenile delinquency or
complex organization. Rather, he repeatedly
stresses the point that juvenile delinquency is a
socially constructed phenomenon but does not
provide the reader with any systematic analysis
of the social structure which generates juvenile
delinquency.
I F.

(1938).
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Finally, it seems to me that if Professor
Cicourel's propositions were carried to their
logical conclusions, we would arrive at an epistemological position that would make the current anomie in criminological theory look reassuring by comparison. Specifically, if we accept
Cicourel's views on the possibilities of "knowing" anything for sure, we would all become
agnostics. Each observer's construction of reality, it seems, would have to be compared with
that of another observer, and so on until the
level of "proof' required in making claims to
knowledge would be so unreasonable that the
chances of generating or testing any theory
would be remote. Perhaps this sort of nihilism
helps explain the absence of a theoretical
framework in Cicourel's book.
SOCIAL RESEARCH IN CONFLICT WITH LAW AND

Edited by Paul Nejelski. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Co.,
1976. Pp. xvii, 197. $15.00.
It is an interesting coincidence (and it appears to be as coincidental as two separate
events can be in a world of interconnected
parts) that the past decade has seen an increase
of concern over problems of ethics in human
research and over problems of crime and antisocial behavior. At first glance, it would seem
that these two areas of anxiety might conflict,
and might even serve as countervailing forces
to neutralize each other. If one were to assume
that research into crime can lead not only to
the generation of knowledge about criminals,
judicial processes, effectiveness of penological
measures, and hence to a diminution of crime,
then one might expect concern over ethics of
research to fade away in an era of increasing
and evidently justifiable fear of criminals. However, the problem of social researchers and
their ethics, or lack of same, appears to be
derived more from the outcry of the public,
scholars, and sometimes government officials
over the medical and biological abuses that
have occurred in the past, rather than from
what constraints on researchers might do to
the fight against crime. This would be a
heartening thought if one were convinced that
concern over ethics had not been fed by a
generally cynical attitude as to the efficacy of
criminological research.
The conference from which this book derives
its title was held at the University of Bielefeld
ETHICS.
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in West Germany in March 1974. It was attended by twenty-five German and ten American participants. Several papers from that conference, all by Americans, are brought together
for this book, and all the papers are important,
make distinct contributions, and deal with relevant and troublesome issues. The answers are
not here (they seldom are, in any work), but
the questions are posed, and demand further
discussion. It is difficult to see how such discussion can proceed without constant reference to
this excellent collection.
No one can contend that the ethical questions
confronting researchers are easy to solve. The
general thrust of these papers seems to favor
the researcher; however, consideration must
also be given the public and those researched.
Unlike physicians, lawyers, and even some psychologists, most social science researchers are
not licensed. Sometimes the researchers are
working out of hospitals, prisons, and other
institutions which can be held accountable and
which hold the researcher in check. While this
brings in some complicating factors of conflict
of loyalties, it also serves as some form of social
control on the researcher. But the sociologists
and other social scientists are often doing things
on their own, and not infrequently the work is
being conducted by a graduate student as part
of a dissertation study, which is given little
supervision by a busy mentor.
That such social scientists, the budding ones
and the established ones, have often grossly
violated the elementary ethical canons would
be reason for ongoing concern; more troublesome, as I see it, is that they have to answer to
no one but themselves. Who are the gatekeepers, and where are they to be found? Will
the sociologists, through one of their organizations, award a medal to someone who enters
the home of an individual he has traced, lies to
that person about the purpose of the visit, and
then uses a grant given for one purpose in
order to obtain information for another?
Sometimes the question is posed: How else
could the knowledge be obtained? It is an
absurd question, as the analogy with biology
and medicine (so often drawn in this book) can
easily demonstrate. A wealth of knowledge
about the human species, even knowledge that
can eventually save more lives than will be
destroyed in the experimentation, can be garnered if biologists could test suspected carcino-
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gens on newborn infants instead of o; mice,
but humanist ethics forbid such activities. It is
not a matter of costs versus benefits, but of
ethical costs that go beyond any conceivable
benefits. This is not to contend that social
science research has the same potential for
unethical enormity and harm to the subjects,
but merely that it is irrelevant to suggest that a
line of research is acceptable because it is the
only possible method of obtaining certain information.
The researcher who has studied crime and
deviance (and other activities, as well, such as
in community studies) often cites his willingness
to protect the anonymity of respondents (including the uninformed respondent, who did
not even know that he was being spied upon).
This anonymity is not always as easy to protect
as the good will of the social scientist might
lead one to believe. Communities, hospitals,
and prisons, become easily recognized by the
cogniscenti, and once recognized, an administrator or an inmate is likewise not protected.
Superficial changes in the names of a city or
state often worsen the matter, because the
researcher (in preparing the manuscript for
publication) often allows himself free expression of opinion in the unfounded belief that
his thinly veiled pseudonyms are impenetrable.
If he changes a great deal of the material he
may be falsifying the data and misleading his
colleagues; and if he changes very little he may
be violating the canons of confidentiality. This
is not an insoluble problem, for considerable
changes can be made without altering the substance of the work, but very few students, and
I would add very few professionals, are both
sensitive to the problem and capable of carrying
out the act of masking without distortion.
Confidentiality is seen by several of the contributors to this volume as primarily concerning
the legal rights of the researcher. They argue
that there should be a researcher's "shield statute," similar to that now being widely discussed
and debated for newsmen, so that the anonymity of subjects is protected. There are many
problems and innumerable exceptions, as legal
scholars have pointed out, in all areas of privileged communication. The physician, spouse,
lawyer, or clergyman is not invariably free
from obligation to report matters to authorities
and to refuse to testify when subpoenaed.
Whether the privileges physicians and others
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do have should be extended to newsmen or
social researchers is a matter to which many
have offered answers with insufficient soulsearching and debate. Some have suggested
such privileges, and have used as example (as
the sole example, mind you) the case of a
researcher working with a group of marijuana
smokers. From one type of case, only conclusions relating to that one type can be drawn.
In order to have researcher's privilege against
being compelled to testify about criminal activities of which he is knowledgeable, one would
have to cover researchers among rapists, swindling politicians, organized crime figures, heroin smugglers, and marijuana smokers. In the
case of pot, the researcher has probably committed the same illegal acts as the people whom
he studied (possession, buying, maybe even
selling). He seeks immunity from prosecution
as a law violator, and if it can be established
that the violation of the law was for the purpose
of obtaining information and that it was done
under the supervision and with the knowledge
of persons to whom he is accountable, then
certainly a good case for such privilege and
immunity can be made out. But it is a case
limited to those victimless crimes for which
there is almost no outrage in the country, and
for which there is a strong decriminilization
movement. It is difficult to extend the argument to arsonists, looters, lynchers, and others.
A distinction that is not raised by the conferees who contributed to this book, except for a
few words by Wolfgang, is between those who
obtain knowledge before and after the fact.
Researchers who learn of criminal activity that
is being planned are not in the same position
as those who learn of it later. Some might
propose, as is done by at least one author, that
researchers should avoid such situations: they
can interview the incarcerated individuals,
rather than the presently active ones, for example. Sometimes a study of the activists is
exactly what is desired, and learning about
major and gross crime that has not yet been
committed takes place despite a social scientist's
desire to avoid such knowledge. What are the
legal and ethical obligations? To whom shall he
answer if he fails to report a planned bombing
by an irredentist group with which he is not
only in contact as researcher but with which he
may be in sympathy as a citizen?
Another question that I believe requires

greater thought is the distinction between the
research into the publicly accountable and the
research involving the private citizen or group.
The White House, regulatory agencies, legislative and judicial bodies, police departments,
and probably large business organizations, all
should be researchable because they belong to
the public. There is here no question of privacy, but only one of secrecy. Their privacy
cannot be invaded, because they are public,
not private, organizations. However, they can
best serve the public by retaining some secrecy,
a requirement which by the nature of organization will almost always be abused. By contrast, people who go out on double dates, blind
dates, or as interracial couples are doing this as
a private activity, and should not be researched
without foreknowledge and informed consent.
But what of youth gangs, heroin users, members of an illegal secessionist group-are they
publicly accountable?
In one of the many fine articles in this book,
Eliot Friedson writes: "The symbolic case for
the status of the researcher was that of Popkin,
who was jailed in Boston when he refused to
reveal the identity of persons he interviewed in
the -course of his research on Vietnam." Yes,
the symbolic case, but hardly the limiting or
typical one (and it was chosen to become symbolic, because it did not touch the most sensitive
issues). Those who came to Popkin's defense
did not define the people he was protecting as
criminal; if anything, they defined as criminal
his prosecutors and persecutors. There is no
great ethical dilemma when the researcher is a
good guy protecting the other good guys. The
problem is what to do about research, anonymity, confidentiality, privilege from disclosure,
and immunity from prosecution as an accessory
before and after the fact, when it is crime, real
good old-fashioned crime, that is being studied.
EDWARD SAGARIN

Professor of Sociology
City College of New York and
Graduate Center,
City University of New York

Edited by Daniel
Glaser. Chicago, Illinois: Rand McNally College Publishing Company, 1974. Pp. xiii,
1180. $35.00
In the Preface to the Handbook of Cfiminology

HANDBOOK OF CRIMINOLOGY.
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Daniel Glaser writes: "The objective of this
book is to present the most comprehensive and
authoritative statement possible on all aspects
of criminology." Although this is a demanding
bill of goods to fill, the final product comes
remarkably close to filling it. In terms of both
the number and variety of criminological topics
discussed and the generally high quality of the
discussions, the Handbook makes an important
contribution to the literature which attempts to
assess the state of the art in criminology. Although there are lacunae, this work contains
many detailed summaries of the adequacy of
our knowledge in a variety of criminological
topics.
The book is divided into four parts, the first
of which deals with theoretical and empirical
explanations of criminal behavior, the second
with law enforcement and adjudication, the
third with corrections and the fourth with the
prevention of crime. The first part covers the
widest range of material and includes offenders
and offenses, sociological and biological theories of crime and discussions of specific forms
of criminal behavior, viz., violent, sex, drugs,
white collar, professional and collective. The
second part is more focused, dealing only with
police, prosecutors and courts, with the last
topic being discussed from both American and
comparative perspectives. The issue of discretion is common to many of the contributions in
this section and serves as a unifying theme.
The section on corrections is quite comprehensive and discusses theoretical and administrative issues in the area. There are specific contributions on behavior modification, jails,
prisons, juvenile institutions, community corrections, parole, probation, reform efforts and
evaluation. The last section on prevention is
the shortest, containing only two essays, one
presenting an economic approach to the study
of crime and the second a more general discussion of prevention.
Although the comprehensive nature of the
work is commendable, there are some criminological areas that are either ignored or dealt
with inadequately. Among them are the psychological and psychiatric approaches to crime,
methodological issues and criminal statistics,
female criminality, race and crime, communitybased corrections, the evaluation of intervention strategies, prediction and crime prevention. Although these topics are not covered
adequately in the handbook, their absence does
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not detract from the overall comprehensiveness
of the work nor from the generally high caliber
of the papers that are included.
In sum, the Handbook of Criminology is a quite
useful addition to the criminological literature.
It should be of value to the professional, both
academic and administrator, as well as advanced students.
TERENCE P. THORNBERRY
University of Pennsylvania
Center for Studies in Criminology
and Criminal Law

MURDER

IN SPACE

CITY

by Henry P.

Lunds-

gaarde. New York: Oxford University Press,
1977. Pp. x, 269. $10.95.
The book behind this sexy title is a substandard work of urban anthropology coupled to an
excellent analysis of the legal and cultural
meaning of homicide in Houston, Texas.
Lundsgaarde's basic thesis is that there is an
interaction between rules, sanctions, and homicide in any community. He argues that the
lack of legal concern or sanction for most
killings is both a reflection of the cultural
meaning of homicide in Houston and a precursor to additional deaths. He concludes that
only strangers to stranger killings are likely to
result in long prison terms.
Lundsgaarde's point is well taken. But he
errs in his belief that the cultural meaning of
homicide in Houston differs from its meaning
in other American communities. Much of this
parochialism results from a lack of consideration of other research on the legal and social
meaning of homicide. His neglect of the substantial body of literature on the meaning of
southern violence is especially damning. His
discussion of the broadening of the meaning
of justifiable homicide to include property and
non-immediate or minor threats is very similar
to that of Kalven and Zeisel's study in The
AmericanJury,' a classic which he does not cite.
However, the basic problem of this book is
not bibliographical but empirical. Lundsgaarde's primary data source is the 1969 files
of the homicide division of the Houston Police
Department and subsequent court records. He
presents police reports and transcriptions of
many cases and apparently expects the reader
to connect particular incidents to the structure
I H.
(1966).
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of his theory. I had great difficulty doing this
and I felt that a great deal of this substantial
body of data was wasted. Much more can be
learned about the cultural meaning of violent
death from Malinowski's in-depth examination
of one incident among the Trobriand islanders
than from the theoretically unconnected incidents reported in this book.
In general, Lundsgaarde promises much
more than he delivers; however, the book is
not without value. It is useful for comparison
with earlier studies of homicide in Houston
and with studies of homicide and violent crime
in other cities. Comparison with other cities
shows that the percentage of deaths resulting
from firearms, and the probability of a grand
jury "no bill" are higher in Houston than in
other cities, and the definition of justifiable
homicide is very wide in Houston.
Lundsgaarde's discussion of the meaning of
"homicide as custom and crime" (Chapter Six)
is excellent. In this chapter he demonstrates
how law and custom interact and result in
sometimes clear but usually fuzzy legal definitions of criminal acts. However, this chapter is
written in the tradition of legal rather than
anthropological research with many citations
and historical references. In this chapter more
than any other he succeeds in making his point
about the relationship of crime, sanctions, and
culture. However, the value and presentation
is negated by the sloppiness and lack of insight
in the remainder of the book.
Lundsgaarde believes that criminology has
failed to develop an adequate social theory of
homicides because it has failed to recognize the
interrelationship of culture and crime. The
perspective of urban anthropology can add to
our understanding of violent crime; however,
the few valuable insights in this book seem to
come from a legal rather than an anthropological tradition. I believe this book would be of
value only to researchers actively studying
criminal violence.
RICHARD BLOCK

Associate Professor
Loyola University of Chicago

THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION PROCESS. By Pe-

ter W. Greenwood,Jan M. Chaiken, Joan Petersilia & Linda Prusoff. Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Co., 1977. Pp. xx,
326. $15.00.

Police methods and practices have been under close and constant scrutiny for some years.
The best known Supreme Court decisions of
the last decade dealt with the constitutional
validity of the most basic investigatory police
practices: electronic eavesdropping, searches
and seizures, interrogation of defendants and
eye-witness identification. The Criminal Investigation Process, though, does not direct its attention to the Court's objections to investigatory
methods in recent years. The focus here is on
the role of police investigators' work in crime
solving.
The authors have undertaken to discover
current investigative methods employed by police departments throughout the country, assess the effect of police investigation on solving
crimes and determine the usefulness of new
technology in police work. Data were obtained
through distribution of questionnaires (300
sent, 153 answered), personal observation by
the researchers of police detectives at work
and collection of information contained in departmental records and case files.
Most detectives receive little substantive supervision and are largely left to structure their
own workday. This is a matter of general
knowledge. In fact, the automony of police
investigators is the primary characteristic of
their work. Learning how investigators make
use of their time is enough to make this book
worth reading. For example, a considerable
amount of a detective's time is spent engaged
in administrative activity, public relations work
and activities designed to prevent crime.
Regarding the efforts of detectives actually
aimed at solving crimes, it is first noted that
police agencies are reluctant to read professional publications advocating a systematized
approach to investigation and prefer to rely on
trial-and-error street experience. Preparation
for most detective work is still a matter of onthe-job training. The most distressing news
about the investigative process as it is currently
carried out is that it seems not to contribute
much to the solving of crimes. Data gathered
indicate that detective work is not characterized
by hard work or "special action" leading to
case solutions and that most cases are "solved"
either because the solution is obvious or because of routine methods of suspect identification. Extensive, complicated detective work as
described in fictional detective stories is rarely
applied to identify a criminal culprit. The study
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indicates that most cases are cleared through
simple means or they are never cleared. For
example, analysis of one group of cases demonstrates that most thefts are solved because
the suspect is usually caught in the act or
observed leaving the scene and the automobile
license number recorded. Residential burglaries are solved "mostly ...

by luck." In many

such cases the victim or witness knows the
suspect. Perhaps because of the "self-solving"
nature of most crimes, use of sophisticated
devices to collect and process physical evidence
has not expanded greatly since technical capabilities of the departments have grown.
For these reasons, the authors conclude that
it is inappropriate to view the investigator's
role as that of solving crimes. Their belief that
most of what little work is devoted to solving
crimes could be performed by clerical personnel and that any justification for the work of
investigators must lie in areas other than crime
solution should cause police administrators to
reevaluate their own investigative units.
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Kennedy that the book is an important one to
be read and debated by anyone interested in
the issue of sentencing reform.
The major strength of this book is its concise
yet thorough discussion of issues central to
sentencing reform. It is apparent that the
workshop took into account major relevant
works, reports and recommended standards.
The book describes impediments to a just and
effective sentencing system, proposes solutions,
argues against other proposed solutions and
covers issues which still need to be addressed.
The workshop concluded that:
Substantial disparities are the inevitable result
of judicial discretion exercised by 378 federal
district judges across the country, unfettered by
legislatively established criteria and not subject
to the uniform requirements of procedural regularity and prescribed substantive criteria that
appellate review lends to almost every other
area of the law. (p. 10)

The provisions described and defended in
this book seek to remedy this situation by
Assistant State's Attorney providing a procedural framework within
Cook County, Illinois which judges must justify each sentence by
relating it to the major purposes of sentencing.
In addition the system would provide for appellate review of the sentences, replace the
TOWARD A JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING
present parole system with a determinant sentSYSTEM. By Pierce O'Donnell, MichaelJ. Churencing scheme and eliminate good-time and
gin & Dennis E. Curtis. New York: Praeger
substitute a fixed, well-defined early release
Publishers, 1977. Pp. xvi, 137. $16.50.
program. A final very important provision of
In 1974 the Yale Law School, with monetary
the proposed statute would establish a National
support from the Daniel and Florence GuggenCommission on Sentencing and Corrections to
heim Foundation, organized a clinical workdevise guidelines for federal sentencing policy
shop to address reform of the federal sentencand to provide feedback on its effectiveness.
ing and parole systems. Scholars, students and
A major conclusion of the workshop is that
professionals representing federal sentencing,
sentences in America are excessively long. Acprobation, parole and corrections areas met
cordingly the recommended maximum senfrequently to consider these issues. This book,
tence lengths for different offense classes have
whose authors were workshop participants, is
been substantially reduced in the proposed
both a report of that workshop and a public
statute. Comparisons in recommended seneducation effort to develop support for a protence length between this proposal and other
posed federal sentencing statute which also
pieces of federal legislation are clearly pregrew out of the workshop.
sented in table form. Other differences are
The foreword was written by Senator Edpresented in a tedious and somewhat confusing
ward M. Kennedy who credits the workshop
narrative format.
findings with constituting the foundation of
One major area identified as requiring furSenate Bill 2699, "The Sentencing Guidelines
ther thought is the relationship of the sentencBill" which he introduced in the 94th
ing criteria to guilty pleas. The issues related
Congress.' This reviewer agrees with Senator
to this question are fully identified in contrast
' S. 2699 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
to the remaining issues which are so briefly
ALICE -L. CHATHAS

presented as to leave questions in the reader's
mind concerningjust what the issues are.
With only these minor shortcomings, the
book remains an effective advocate for the
sentencing reform it describes. It is a useful
source document by which readers with varying
backgrounds can quickly review the major issues. In thinking through these issues on the
federal level, the reader will also be better
equipped to understand sentencing reform legislation currently enacted or proposed in many
states.
MARILYN C.

SLIVKA

Adult Probation Department
Court of Common Pleas
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
By William Ker Muir, Jr. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1977. Pp. xi, 306. $15.00.
Police: Street Corner Politicians is a study of
twenty-eight randomly selected policemen and
their adaptations to the problem of coercive
power inherent in police work. The research
site is a graft free professional organization
and the sample was drawn from all officers
who had been selected and trained under the
department's new professional standards.
Following their interviews and a follow-up
observation one year later, each subject was
assigned to one of four types in a typology of
adaptations to the use of coercive power. The
professional policeman (Type 1) conformed to
Weber's model of a professional politician. He
was able to morally reconcile the use of force
while maintaining empathy for his fellow man.
The remaining types were nonprofessional adaptations: (Type 2) enforcers -cynics who believed in the strict enforcement of the law;
(Type 3) reciprocators- those who were unwilling to use their coercive powers; (Type 4)
avoiders -those who eschewed situations which
did not involve a clear-cut violation of the law.
POLICE: STREET CORNER POLITICIANS.

Type 4 was the most dangerous adaptation as
"the strong, the mean, the indifferent, the
victimizers of the world had free access to their
prey where the police were avoiders."
For several reasons this work contributes to
the burgeoning literature on police behavior.
It is a well written analysis of the developmental
process involved in police adaptations to the
use of coercive power. Students of the police
will find Muir's typology to be very useful.
Furthermore, the research adds to James Q.
Wilson's description of police order-maintenance duties. Each of the scenarios depicted in
Muir's section on the paradoxes of coercive
behavior falls within the purview of ordermaintenance duties. The role of a street corner
politician may be the key to these duties. Muir's
professional police officer copes with disorderly
situations when law enforcement activities are
inappropriate or not applicable. The "professional" uses his personal qualities and verbal
skills to de-fuse the situation and open up
lines of communication between him and the
citizen. The nonprofessional officer, according
to the typology, is unable to deal with the
subtleties and ambiguities involved in ordermaintenance duties.
The author also presents an insightful discourse into the dynamics involved in the police
officer's separation of his official contacts into
"governables" or "rebels," ti la Skolnick and
the "symbolic assailant." Finally, the reader
becomes painfully aware that the introduction
of professional standards by police organizations does not insure "professional" responses
on the part of individual officers. But, then,
one can still speculate as to the findings in a
graft ridden nonprofessional police organization.
THOMAS BARKER, Dean
School of Law Enforcement
Jacksonville State University
Jacksonville, Alabama

